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Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the

Modern Supreme Court and
Four Doctrinal Approaches

to Judicial Decision-making
R. Randall Kelso*

INTRODUCTION

The decade between 1985 and 1995 witnessed a resurgence in debate
over questions of statutory interpretation.' Prior to this, the "Legal Process" approach of the 1950s seemed to resolve most questions of statutory interpretation. Under this approach, popularized by Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks in The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law,2 courts paid careful attention "to the context and
the particular application of the statute."3 Through this analysis, a court

Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. B.A., 1976, University of Chicago; J.D., 1979, University of Wisconsin.
1. See generally William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L REv. 26 (1994); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the
Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L REV. 241
(1992); David L Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L REv. 921 (1992); Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory
Interpretation,45 VAND. L REv. 533 (1992); Symposium on Statutory Interpretation,
66 Cm.-KENT L REv. 301 (1990).
2. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent ed. 1958).

3. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The 'Nvew" New Legal Process,
12 CARDOzo L REV. 1597, 1601 (1991). On the Legal Process school generally, see id.
at 1599-1614 (discussing the Legal Process school as developed in HART & SACKS,
supra note 2); William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L REv. 691, 694-99 (1987) (also
discussing the Legal Process school developed by Henry M. Hart and Albert M.
Sacks).

"could discern the statutory purpose. Once selected, the court could
test the purpose along a range of applications, with the goal being to
avoid an irrational pattern of applications."4 Under this approach, resort could be "made to the legislative history to glean the statutory purpose."5 Where leeway existed in determining what the statute meant
after considering legislative history and purpose, the "task for the
court" was "to fit the statute into the legal system as a whole" to make
"coherent public policy."6
By 1985, the illusion that the Legal Process school of the 1950s had
brought agreement to the proper approach to statutory interpretation
had become fractured in a number of ways. In the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist began this process of fracturing in the late 1970s and early 1980s when they questioned the validity of the Legal Process approach, particularly its broad use of legislative history and legislative purpose in statutory interpretation. In doing
so, they supported what has been called an "originalist" approach to
statutory interpretation.8 Originalism resolves interpretive questions by
asking how the enacting Congress would have decided the question. As
has been noted, "[o]riginalism accepts that there will be questions left
unresolved by Congress but requires that these gaps be filled by faithful
execution of Congress's desires ....
The court asks only what the
enacting Congress would have done; subsequent events or the state of
the world today are not a basis for decision."9
Justice Scalia's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1984 invigorated
this questioning of the Legal Process school. Justice Scalia's "New
Textualism" approach to questions of statutory interpretation was stated as a clear alternative to the Legal Process school. ° Under this ap-

4. Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1601.
5. Id. at 1605.
6. See id. at 1601.
7. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 221 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("Today, however, the Court behaves much like the Orwellian speaker earlier described ....

Accordingly, without even a break in syntax, the Court rejects 'a

literal construction of [the statute]'

in favor of newly discovered

'legislative

history' . ..... ); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) (Burger,

C.J., delivering the opinion of the Court) ("When confronted with a statute which is
plain and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as
a guide to its meaning.").
8. See generally Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpre-

tation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L REV. 1073, 1078-80 (1992) (summizing an
originalist approach to statutory interpretation).
9. Id. at 1078-79.
10. See generally Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDozo L REV. 1663 (1991); Zeppos, supra note 3, at
1614-20.
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proach, statutory interpretation focuses almost exclusively on the plain
meaning of the statute's text, augmented by consideration of the text of
related statutes (statutes in pari matenia), and by consideration of
traditional canons of statutory construction." Legislative history, because it is not part of the statute's text, should not be used to help
determine a statute's meaning. 2 During the 1980s, Justice Scalia's New
Textualism approach gained some support, particularly among Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. 3 Justice Thomas has also indicated strong support for Justice Scalia's New Textualism
model of statutory interpretation. 4
Over the last five years, support has waned for Justice Scalia's New
Textualism model of statutory interpretation. Only Justice Thomas has
remained a consistently faithful ally. 5 Justices Stevens, Souter,

11. See William D. Popkin, An "Internal"Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L REV. 1133, 113340 (1992); Zeppos, supra note 3,
at 1615-16.
12. See William N. Eslaidge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L REv. 621, 650-56
(1990); Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1615-17.
13. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.) ("1I]t does not
foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with which the Court is more comfortable."); Zeppos, supra
note 3, at 1598-99 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy's support
for the New Textualism model). But see Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701,
705, 711-37 (1989) (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Kennedy, J., concurring) (using legislative history to
help interpret the statute); id. at 738 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I join Parts I and IV of
the Court's opinion, and Part 1I except insofar as it relies upon legislative history.").
14. See James Fagan, The Legal Phoenix: The Plain Meaning Rule is Dead, Long
Live the Rule, 29 CAL. W. L REV. 373, 385 n.79 (1993) (citing, inter aia, United
States v. R.LC., 503 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
15. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 676-77 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.)
("I join all of the Court's opinion, except to the extent that it relies on the notably
With such plain statutory language in hand, there is
unhelpful legislative history ....
no reason to rely on legislative history."); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct.
1396, 1406-07 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
runs
by Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J., and Scalia, J.) ("[Tihe Court's conclusion ...
contrary to common sense and finds no support in the text of the relevant statute.");
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Thomas, J.) ("The Court attempts to minimize the amendment's
harshness . . . , quoting some post-legislation legislative history (another oxymoron)

Ginsburg, and Breyer clearly reject the New Textualism model of statutory interpretation." Although initially sympathetic to Justice Scalia's
approach, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
typically reject it now as well.'7 However, a majority of the Court
shows no inclination to advocate a return to the Legal Process school.
Rather, the approach to statutory interpretation sketched by Justice
Breyer in law review articles and Supreme Court cases seems to represent,the majority approach on the current Supreme Court.'8
The intent of this Article is to place into context the various approaches of the Supreme Court regarding questions of statutory interpretation. In undertaking this task, I will use a conceptual scheme developed elsewhere to analyze approaches to judicial decision..making.
That scheme states that in American legal history there have been four
main approaches to judicial decision-making: natural law, formalism,
Holmesian, and instrumentalism.'" Understanding these four types of
judicial decision-making styles can help make sense of the various arguments concerning statutory interpretation used by the Court today.
In pursuit of this goal, Part I of this Article will examine the various
versions of natural law, formalist, Holmesian, and instrumentalist approaches to statutory interpretation. This discussion will conclude that
Justice Scalia's New Textualism is an example of a formalist approach,

to show that, despite the uncontested plain meaning of the statute, Congress never
meant it to apply . . .).

16. See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp., 116 S. Ct at 1401 & n.6 (Ginsburg, J., delivering
the opinion of the Court) (stating that legislative purpose and legislative history is
critical in making sure statutory exemptions are not "expansively interpreted" contrary
to legislative intent); Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S.
Ct. 637, 643-45 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J.) (contra Justice
Scalia, legislative history is "useful to conscientious and disinterested judges trying to
understand the statute's meaning"); American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247,
252-65 (1992) (Souter, J., delivering the opinion of the Court) (using precedent, purpose, and legislative history to augment the ordinary meaning of the statute's words).
17. See, e.g., Dunn v. Conunodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 117 S. Ct. 913, 921
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (no other Justice joining Justice Scalia in applying his
textualism model to reject the use of legislative history); Bank One Chicago, N.A.,
116 S. Ct. at 645 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("[Tihe law is what the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it
rather than psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.")
18. See, e.g., O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) (Breyer, J., delivering the
opinion of the court); Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414 (1995) (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court); Stephen
G. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L
REV. 845 (1992). For elaboration of this approach to statutory interpretation, see infra text accompanying notes 21-46.
19. See R. Randall Kelso, Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modern Supreme
Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-making, 20 PEP?. L REV.
531, 532-63 (1993).
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Originalism is an example of a Holmesian approach, the Legal Process
school is an example of an instrumentalist approach, and Justice
Breyer's approach is a modem version of the traditional natural law
approach to statutory interpretation. Part H of this Article will put into
context the modem Supreme Court debate, concluding that the Court is
likely to adopt a modem version of the traditional natural law model of
statutory interpretation. As discussed herein, this approach has great
affinities with a Holmesian approach. As part of this approach, the use
of legislative purpose to help interpret a statute, and resort to legislative history to help illuminate legislative intent, will be discussed. Part
HI will provide a brief conclusion.
I. FOUR STYLES OF INTERPRETATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION DOcTRINE

As I have discussed more fully elsewhere, it can prove useful to analyze American legal history in terms of four major judicial decisionmaking styles: natural law, formalism, Holmesian, and
instrumentalism." The following discussion presents a summary of
these four decision-making styles in the context of statutory interpretation.
A. The Natural Law Approach
As developed during the 17th and 18th centuries in England and the
United States, the natural law approach to interpretation calls for a
judge to interpret a statute in light of the framer's intent, as revealed by
the traditional sources for determining intent." These sources include,
among other things, the plain meaning of the statutory language, the

20. See generally R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the
Four Main Approaches to ConstitutionalInterpretation in American Legal History,
29 VAL U. L REV. 121 (1994) [hereinafter Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation]; Kelso, supra note 19, at 532-63; see also R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D.
KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCION 101-23, 261-310, 388-423 (1984) [hereinafter
KELSO & KELSO, STUDYING LAW] (discussing the four decision-maling styles in the context of common-law, statutory, and constitutional decision-maling); Charles D. Kelso

& R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformations in Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. TOL L REV. 93, 98-108 (1996) [hereinafter Kelso &
Kelso, Transformations] (summarizing the four decision-maling styles).
21. See generally Hans W. Baade, '"riginalIntent" in Historical Perspective: Some
Critical Glosses, 69 TEx. L REV. 1001, 1006-08 (1991); Michael Moore, A Natural Law
Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL L REV. 277 (1985).

purpose behind the law or "mischief to be remedied," and traditional
maxims of statutory construction.' Because judges in the natural law
tradition understood the limits of human capacity to express intent

perfectly in the literal words used, the literal (or ordinary) meaning of
words in the statute was never sufficient under a natural law approach
to determine the statute's plain meaning. Rather, in addition to focusing
on the ordinary meaning of words used in the statute, the purpose behind the words used was critical in the initial stage of determining the

words' plain meaning.'
In his 1833 work, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story summarized these then-

22. See Baade, supra note 21, at 1013-43; see also WILLIAM WINSLow CROSSKEY,
PoLMcs AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 363-67 (1953).
Crosskey notes:
The rules of interpretation ordinarily followed in the eighteenth century, and,
likewise, the modes of draftsmanship then in use, were, in certain important

particulars, different from those in common use today. Thus, the eighteenthcentury draftsman felt no obligation to spell out every last detail in the documents he drew. This was sometimes done; and when it was done, the results, in point of verbosity and opacity, were about what they are in such
efforts today. But, in the eighteenth century, there was a well-recognized
alternative to this now familiar technique, another and simpler method, which
seems quite generally to have been preferred in documents addressed to
public- comprehension. Under this simpler method, the over-all purpose of a
document was stated carefully in general terms.
Id. at 363-64.
23. See CROSSKEY, supra note 22, at 363-64. Crosskey notes:
[T]he over-all purpose of a document was stated carefully in general terms;
details were put in, only where, for some particular reason, details seem required; and the rest was left to the rules of interpretation customarily followed by the courts. The rules that were followed were partly a result, and
partly the cause, of this method of drafting. Justified by the fact that no
draftsman is possessed of an infinite prescience, they were calculated to give
a just and well-rounded interpretation to every document, in the light of its
declared general purpose; or, if its purpose was not declared, then, in the
light of its apparent purpose, so far as this could be discovered.
Id.at 364; see also Moore, supra note 21, at 383-84.
Moore explains:
Once a judge determines the ordinary meaning of words that make up a text
and modifies that ordinary meaning with any statutory definitions or case law
developments, there is still at least one more task. A judge must check the
provisional interpretation reached from these ingredients with an idea of how
well such an interpretation serves the purpose of the rule in question.
The necessity for asking this question of purpose Lon Fuller made familiar to
us in his famous 1958 debate with HLA. Hart.
Id.

JudicialDecision-making
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prevalent rules of interpretation.' 4 As stated by Justice Story in 1833,
"the reason and spirit of the law, or the causes, which led to its enactment, are often the best exponents of the words, and limit their application."25 Writing more than a century later, Professor William Crosskey,
of the University of Chicago, underscored this method of interpretation
as focusing on the purpose underlying the statutory language." This
regard for the "cause" or "reason" for a law is stated most famously in
Heydon's Case, a 1584 decision.

24. See J. STORY,

COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED

STATES

§§ 397-456 (1833). For a commentary on Justice Story and his place in the natural
law tradition of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see JAMES McCLELLAN,
JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (orig. ed. 1971, reissued ed. 1990).
Professor McClellan states:
Among the American lawyers and judges of this creative and resourceful era
in legal development [the early nineteenth century], Judge Story stands out as
possibly the most learned and influential defender of the natural law tradition. To Story it was imperative that American lawyers understand natural
law in interpreting and applying the principles of the Constitution and the
common law. Being "a philosophy of morals," natural law was to Story the
substratum of the legal system, resting "at the foundation of all other laws."
Id. at 65.
25., STORY, supra note 24, § 400.
26. See CROssKEY, supra note 22, at 363-67. As Crosskey noted about 18th century
theories of statutory interpretation:
"The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator,
is," says Blackstone, "by exploring his intentions at the time when the law
was made, by signs the most natural and probable." "These signs," he then
goes on to explain, "are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the
effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law." As for the last
of these - that is, "the reason and spirit of [a law]; or the cause which
moved the legislator to enact it," - it is, says Blackstone, "the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the
words are dubious."
Id. at 366.
27. 76 Eng. Rptr. 637 (1584). The "Rule of Heydon's Case", as stated by Lord
Coke, provides:
[Fior the sure and true ...
interpretation of all statutes in general (be they
penal . . . or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging the common law,) four things
are to be discerned and considered: . .. 1st. What was the common law
before the making of the Act ....
2nd. What was the mischief and defect
for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the Parliament
hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. And,
4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is
always to make such ...
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle invention and evasions for con-

In addition to this focus on a statute's purpose, the natural law approach also has great respect for precedent.' This is particularly true
in the area of statutory interpretation.' Thus, prior judicial interpretations of the statute which stand as precedents to its meaning are very
important under a natural law approach to interpretation.
The natural law approach also has great respect for judges exercising
"practical reason" to resolve conflicting interpretations of a statute.'
This is particularly true when deciding which canons of construction to
adopt in a particular case.3

tinuance of the mischief ..
and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act.
Id. at 638.
28. See generally R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court is
Dealing with Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOK L REv. 973, 985-86
(1996). Kelso & Kelso state:
Judges who believe very strongly in this traditional common-law counitment
[to reasoned elaboration of the law] may choose to follow precedents they
believe are wrongly decided even if those precedents do not represent settled
law and there has been no substantial reliance upon them ....
The judges
who most often have this stronger commitment to precedent are judges in
the natural law tradition.
Id.
29. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283-84 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor wrote:
Were we writing on a clean slate, I would adhere to that view ....
But, as
the Court points out, more than 10 years have passed since Southland, several subsequent cases have built upon its reasoning, and parties have undoubtedly made contracts in reliance on the Court's interpretation ....
After
reflection, I am persuaded by considerations of stare decisis, which we have
said "have special force in the area of statutory interpretation," to acquiesce
in today's judgment. Though wrong, Southland has not proved unworkable,
and, as always, "Congress remains free to alter what we have done."
Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)); see also
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172-73 ("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in
the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional
interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter
what we have done.").
30. See generally Warren Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis.
L. REV. 489, 495-504 (1979) (discussing the use by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Plowden of
practical reason and following the equity of a statute).
31. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L REv. 533, 547 (1992). Farber states:
As Lleweliyn demonstrated, the traditional canons can be readily arranged in
conflicting pairs. Typically, the two canons in a given pair are not directly
contradictory, but instead their domains are defined by qualifications such as
'unless the context dictates otherwise.' Application of these conflicting canons
may require a good deal of judgment.
Id. This view that canons of construction must be used cautiously is an old, tradi-
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In theory, a natural law approach to interpretation could counsel
that, where leeway exists, the judge should be willing to depart from
the legislature's actual intent to interpret a statute in a way to achieve a
"just" result.' Some natural law theories have been criticized on this
ground.' However, natural law judges in the American tradition have
operated out of the Enlightenment vision of a society based upon a social contract.' Under this social contract vision, the role of the judge
in statutory interpretation is to follow the in-fact intent of the legislature.

35

tional view of the common law. See STORY, supra note 24, § 448 ("[While] maxims
[of construction], rightly understood and rightly applied, undoubtedly furnish safe
guides to assist us in the task of exposition[, ... they are susceptible of being
applied, and indeed are often ingeniously applied, to the subversion of the text, and
the objects [purpose] of the instrument.").
32. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 31, at 540-41; Moore, supra note 21, at 358
(discussing whether judges should place a "good" interpretation on statutory language
based upon "[t]he meanings of words, the direction of precedent, and the nature of
goodness"). Farber uses the phrase "practical reason" to slip from a restrained natural law interpretation model to a more judicially activist model, and permits consideration not only of "text, legislative history [and] statutory purpose," but also of "contemporary public policy." See Farber, supra note 31, at 540-41. Such an approach is
more appropriately viewed as a version of instrumentalism, as Farber's cites to Karl
Llewellyn suggest See id. at 537-40; ifra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
33. See Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy,
71 B.U. L REV. 767, 771-72 (1991) (criticizing the approach of Professor Michael
Moore); see also supra note 32.
34. See generally R Randall Keiso, The Natural Law Tradition on the Modern
Supreme Court: Not Burke, But the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke,
Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST. MARY'S UJ. 1051, 1067-73 (1995) (discussing how the
Enlightenment's concept of government as a social contract limits judicial discretion
to following those principles placed into the Constitution or statutes).
35. See generally Kelso & Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra
note 20, at 159-65 (contrasting the American natural law tradition with a "Platonic
Guardian" natural law model where judges impose natural law principles upon society). Remaining faithful to the American natural law model of interpretation, Professor Michael Moore has rejected the broader implications of his natural law theory of
interpretation by limiting the judge to following the in-fact intent of the drafters of a
document. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See generally Moore, supra
note 21, at 314-18 (discussing six basic values that "justify the judge in accepting a
humbler, more constrained mode of decisionmaldng" based in part on the separation
of powers observation that "[b]ecause legislatures represent the majority's wishes
better than courts do, democracies' legislatures should have their wishes carried out
by a judge even if that judge disagrees with the wisdom of such wishes"); Michael S.
Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L REV. 107, 133-37

In determining statutory purpose, and in determining legislative intent
more generally, one must decide whether resort to legislative history is
ever appropriate. The traditional English and American rule of the 17th
and 18th centuries was that resort to legislative history was never appropriate.' During the 19th century, the American practice evolved to
permit the use of legislative history to help determine legislative in7
tent.

Two natural law approaches to interpretation thus exist. One approach-call it a narrow approach-limits the use of legislative history,
perhaps banning it entirely, or at least limiting its use to help interpret
ambiguous statutes or statutes whose plain meaning would lead to an
absurd result. The traditional natural law approach of the 18th and 19th
centuries in America favored this narrow natural law approach to interpretation."
A second approach-call it a broader approach-counsels the wisdom of permitting resort to legislative history in every case to help
determine legislative intent. This is the approach that evolved during
the 20th century in America.' Modem American natural law theories
of interpretation tend to favor this 20th century American approach.4

(1989) (advancing a limited vision of the judge's role as applied to constitutional
interpretation).
36. See Baade, supra note 21, at 1006-12. Though widely accepted as true, this
conclusion regarding non-use of legislative history in 17th and 18th century England
and America has been questioned. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Original Intent: The Rage
of Hans Baade, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1151 (1993). A brief discussion of this debate appears in KELso & KELso, STUDYING LAw, supra note 20, at 154-55 & nn.118-22.
37. See Baade, supra note 21, at 1043-62. The English rule has also recently been
changed to permit limited use of "statements by a minister or other proponent of the
bill* where "the legislative language is ambiguous or obscure, or if it would lead to
an absurd result." William S. Jordan, III, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance of English Practice, 29 U.S.F. L Ruv. 1, 12 (1994).
38. See Baade, supra note 21, at 1013-43; H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L REV. 885, 935-44 (1985).
39. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is
available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear
the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'").
40. This tendency is consistent with the basic premises of the traditional natural
law model of interpretation, updated to reflect contemporary use of legislative history
as an aid in statutory interpretation. For example, as Chief Justice Marshall noted in
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805): "Where the mind labours
to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing [sic] from which aid
can be derived." This is true even though Justice Marshall might well be "shocked"
by the contemporary use of legislative history. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 622 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (claiming that the Court's
practice of using legislative history "would have shocked John Marshall"). Chief Justice Marshall lived in the traditional natural law age when resort to legislative history
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Justice Breyer's approach to statutory interpretation reflects this
modem natural law approach to statutory interpretation. Justice
Breyer's approach places great weight on statutory language, purpose,
and precedent.4' Justice Breyer also supports the use of legislative history to move beyond literal interpretation of a statute and to aid consideration of legislative purpose in interpreting a statute." This is particularly true, Justice Breyer has noted, in five kinds of cases: "(1) avoiding an absurd result; (2) preventing the law from turning on a drafting
error, (3) understanding the meaning of specialized terms; (4) understanding the 'reasonable purpose' a provision might serve; and (5)
choosing among several possible 'reasonable purposes' for language in a
politically controversial law."4' Justice Breyer also supports the use of
practical reason to aid interpretation when the statute is not otherwise
clear."
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Bailey v. United States' also represents a good example of this modem natural law approach. As Justice
O'Connor noted,
We start, as we must, with the language of the statute .... We consider not only
the bare meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory
scheme. "The meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context." ... [Clanon[s] of construction [are also used]. The amendment['s] [legislative] history... casts further light on Congress'[sic] intended meaning.""6

to aid interpretation was not the norm. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text. Even at that time, however, Chief Justice Marshall pushed the limits of the
traditional non-use of legislative history. See Mortier, 501 U.S. at 610 n.4 (White, J.)
(invoking Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Wallace v. Parker, 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 680,
687-90 (1832), to support the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation).
41. See, e.g., O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995) (Breyer, J., delivering
the opinion of the court) (looking to "the considerations underlying" the habeas corpus statute).
42. See, e.g., Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing
Co., 513 U.S. 414 (1995) (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court) (relying
upon statutory language, purpose, and legislative history to interpret the statute).
43. Breyer, supra note 18, at 861.
44. See id. at 847; O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 443-44 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of
the court) ("Third, our rule has certain administrative virtues . . . [which] are not
determinative, but offer a practical caution against a legal rule that, in respect to
precedent and purpose, would run against the judicial grain.").
45. 116 U.S. 501 (1995).
46. Id. at 506-07 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).

B. The FormalistApproach to Statutory Interpretation
As discussed in previous articles, formalist judges follow a positivist
approach to judicial decision-making. 7 This means a formalist sees the
judge as a scientist who attempts to decide cases in light of existing
positive law.' In statutory interpretation cases, a judge focused on existing positive law would naturally tout the virtues of following the original "positive" intent of the legislature which enacted the statute under
consideration.
At the same time, the formalist's general preference for logic and symmetry means that a formalist approach prefers doctrinal development in
which the judge's sole function is to apply rules mechanically to the case
at hand. 9 A formalist prefers clear, bright-line rules.' Because inquiry
into the in-fact intent of a legislature can be a messy proposition, a formalist judge is likely to be tempted to dispense with original intent in
favor of asking merely what the statute's words mean. Determining the
meaning of a statute's words can be done in a more mechanical fashion.
Thus, the classic formalist line is perhaps best stated by the maxim that
the court is not to determine legislative intent, but rather to interpret
solely what the statute's words mean." In making this determination,

47. See H.LA. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L REV. 593 (1958). See generally Kelso, supra note 19, at 533-38.
48. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE
LAW 91-109 (rev. ed. 1974) (discussing positivism in legal philosophy, and in its relation to "law as science" and the separation of law and morals). See generally Kelso,
supra note 19, at 536-37.
49. See Kelso, supra note 19, at 533 & n.14; see also Roscoe Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L REv. 605 (1908).
50. See Kelso, supra note 19, at 535-38; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law
of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L REV. 1175 (1989); see also Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 555-56 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined
by Scalia, J.) ("The test I have proposed would produce much the same results as
the Sisson analysis without the need for wasteful litigation over threshold jurisdictional questions. Because Sisson departed from a century of precedent, is unworkable,
and is easily replaced with a bright-line rule, I concur only in the judgment.").
51. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("We are to read the words of that text as any ordinary Member of Congress would
have read them."). See generally ANTONIN ScA A, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1996).
One authority for this "objective" approach to statutory interpretation is the oft-quoted line of Justice Holmes, "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask
only what the statute means." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899). However, as has been noted, in his actual
approach to statutory interpretation, Holmes followed an originalist approach which
did focus on actual "subjective" legislative intent, rather than the formalist or
textualist approach to statutory interpretation discussed here. See Zeppos, supra note
8, at 1127. In addition, the critical inquiry in any approach to statutory interpretation
is determining which sources the judge is permitted to consider to guide interpreta-
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most formalist judges will resort not only to dictionary definitions of
words, but also to grammatical maxims of construction to help determine what the words mean.52
Three variations of the formalist approach have appeared in AngloAmerican legal history. They are the Literal Rule, the Golden Rule, and
the Plain Meaning Rule. Under the Literal Rule, the court should follow
the statute's literal meaning even if that meaning leads to an absurd result. This literal meaning is determined by considering the dictionary
meaning of the statute's words, supplemented by basic rules of grammar
as reflected in traditional grammatical maxims of statutory construction.

Thus, as stated in the 1892 English case of Regina v. City of London
Court Judge, "[I]f the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them,
even though they lead to a manifest absurdity."' Under this approach,
only if the statute is ambiguous, and thus has no plain meaning, should a

court depart from what the statute literally requires. To my knowledge,
no American court has ever adopted such an extreme approach in practice.'

tion, not categorical labels. Thus, although the above passage from Holmes, as well
as passages from Justice Felix Frankfurter, do speak of rejecting a subjective search
for legislative intent in favor of an objective inquiry into legislative meaning, both
Holmes and Frankfurter rejected formalist limitations on the use of legislative history
and the formalist Plain Meaning Rule, in favor of using legislative purpose and legislative history to help determine objective legislative intent. See generally KELSO &
KELSO, STUDYING LAW, supra note 20, at 282-84, 291-93 (analyzing Frankfurter on legislative purpose and history and discussing the limited difference between the categorical labels of an objective versus subjective theory of intent). Based upon this rejection of formalist limitations, the Holmesian approach to statutory interpretation is distinguishable from a formalist approach. See generally infra text accompanying notes
80-94.
52. See Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1616 ("Justice Scalia has invoked some of the
venerable canons of statutory interpretation.") (citing United States Dep't of Justice v.
Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at Appendix A (listing the canons of statutory interpretation).
53. 1 Q.B. 273, 290 (1892). See generally KEiso & KELSO, STUDYING LAW, supra
note 20, at 280 (discussing the Literal Rule of statutory interpretation).
54. However, pure literalness has "attracted adherents" at various points in
American legal history. See, e.g.,

WILLIAM

L REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PRocEss 198 (1980).

Reynolds states:
In theory, at least, this approach has attracted the attention of a number of
courts, and was particularly popular in England in the Nineteenth Century.
One reason for that popularity was the strong belief by the English courts in
the primacy of Parliament. Paradoxically, the literal rule also attracted adherents because it limited the scope of legislation. For that reason, literal-

A second version of formalism is the Golden Rule of statutory inter-

pretation. The Golden Rule differs from the Literal Rule in that under the
Golden Rule the plain meaning of a statute should not be followed if its
leads to an absurd result. Thus, under the Golden Rule, a court should
depart from the literal text of a statute if the text is ambiguous or the
literal meaning would create an absurd result.' As stated in the famous
English case of Grey v. Pearson, "[T]he grammatical and ordinary sense
of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnancy with the rest of the instrument, in which case
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as
to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency but no further."' Similar is the
7
famous American case of Hamilton v. Rathbone."
In Hamilton, the
Court stated:
The general rule is perfectly well settled that, where a statute is of doubtful meaniag and susceptible upon its face of two constructions, the court may look into
prior and contemporaneous acts, the reasons which induced the act in question,
the mischiefs intended to be remedied, the extraneous circumstances, and the
purpose intended to be accomplished by it, to determine its proper construction.
But where the act is clear upon its face, and when standing alone it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be given to it.8

A third version of formalism is represented by the Plain Meaning Rule.
Carefully stated, the Plain Meaning Rule does not preclude a court from
considering purposes stated on the face of the statute when determining
the meaning of particular language. As Justice Marshall's classic phrasing
of the plain meaning rule indicated in Sturges v. Crowninshield,9 "any
other provision in the same instrument"' may be consulted, including
statements of purpose, to determine a statute's plain meaning.' In con-

ness was prevalent in [the United States] at the turn of the present century,
when judicial hostility toward the legislature reached its peak.
55. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 420-21 (1899); Grey v. Pearson,
10 Eng. Rep. 1216, 1234 (1857). See generaly KELSO & KELSO, STUDYING LAW, supra
note 20, at 280-82 (discussing Hamilton and Grey).
56. Grey, 10 Eng. Rep. at 1234.
57. 175 U.S. 414 (1899).
58. Id. at 419.
59. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
60. Id. at 202-03.
61. See id. The entire passage from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion reads as follows:
Where words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of an instrument bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent unless the natural
and common import of words be varied, construction becomes necessary, and
a departure from the obvious meaning of [the] words is justifiable. But if, in
any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other
provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe
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trast, under the Golden Rule of statutory interpretation as stated in
Hamilton, "the purpose intended to be accomplished" by the statute and
the "mischiefs intended to be remedied"' cannot be considered to create an ambiguity even if that purpose is stated in the statute itself.'
This refusal to consider purposes stated upon the face of the statute in
determining a statute's plain meaning applies even more strictly under
the Literal Rule of City of London County Judge.'
This aspect of the difference between the Golden Rule and Plain Meaning Rule of statutory interpretation has not always been carefully noted
by courts. For example, American courts have occasionally held that the
Plain Meaning Rule restricts a court from considering purposes stated on
the face of the statute.' Some courts have also held that the Plain
Meaning Rule counsels a court not to consider material intrinsic to the
statute such as the statute's title and preamble.' As Justice Marshall's
statement of the Plain Meaning Rule makes clear, however, such a narrow view of what material is properly considered is rejected under a
proper application of the Plain Meaning Rule. 7
A similar difference exists with respect to use of statutes in pari materia to aid in determining a statute's meaning. A narrow view-typically
adopted by adherents of the Literal and Golden Rule-prevents use of
statutes in pari materia to aid in determining the plain meaning of a
statute, stating that the court is only to look to the statute under consid-

the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be
one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the
case, would be so monstrous that all mankind would, without hesitation,
unite in rejecting the application.
Id.; see also United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) ("It is undoubtedly a well established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is
to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted from the
whole."). In Fisher, Chief Justice Marshall considered the statute's title, purpose, and
statutes in pari materia to help determine the statute's meaning. See id. at 386-90.
62. See Hamilton, 175 U.S. at 419.
63. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 58.
64. 1 Q.B. 273, at 290 (1892). See also supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the Literal Rule of statutory interpretation).
65. See Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 F. 462, 465 (8th Cir. 1902), rev'd on
other grounds, 196 U.S. 1 (1904).
66. See In re Camden Shipbuilding Co., 227 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Me. 1964).
67. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing Marshall's view of
the Plain Meaning Rule). See generally KELso & KELso, STUDYING LAW, supra note 20,
at 280-82 (discussing a proper understanding of the Plain Meaning Rule and its differences from the Literal and Golden Rules of statutory construction).

eration to determine its plain meaning.' A broader view, adopted more
by adherents of the Plain Meaning Rule, counsels that like use of a
statute's title, preamble, or statements of purpose on the face of the
statute, use of statutes in pari materia is appropriate to determine the
plain meaning of a statute.'
There is also a disagreement among formalist approaches to statutory
interpretation concerning which canons of statutory construction are
appropriate to adopt. A narrow view states that only those canons of
construction directly related to grammatical meaning, so-called verbal
maxims of construction, should be used. Such a list of verbal maxims
includes: "construe technical words technically; expression of one thing
excludes another (expressio unius est exclusio a/terius); where general
words follow an enumeration of specific words, the general words are to
be held as applying only to the same general kind or class as the specific
words (esjudem generis);" words are to be read in context with neighboring words in the same document (noscitur a sociis); and qualifying
or limiting words refer to the last antecedent term.7" A broader view
states that so-called policy maxims of construction are also appropriate
to use. Such policy maxims reflect background understandings which
inform statutory interpretation, but are not tied directly to grammatical
text. Such policy maxims include: strict construction of penal statutes;
liberal construction of remedial statutes; no man should profit from his
own wrong; clear expression is needed for legislative provisions to have
retroactive application; and presume reasonableness of legislative purpose.7
Despite these disagreements among the Plain Meaning Rule and the
Golden and Literal Rules, all three rules agree on the impermissibility of

68. See Hamilton, 175 U.S. at 419 ("But where the act is clear upon its face, and
when standing alone it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction
must be given to it."). Adherents to the narrow view suggest that because statutes in

pari materia are outside the particular statute under construction, such statutes
should not be resorted to unless the statute to be construed is ambiguous or has an
absurd plain meaning.

69. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPUCATION OF STATUTES 233
(1975) (discussing use of statutes in pari materia to "reflect or buttress a sincere
attempt by the courts to ascertain the [plain] meaning of the statute as read in its
proper context.").
70. See generally Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation,supra note 20, at
131 n.38 (discussing verbal maxims). These maxims are appropriately used even under a narrow approach to interpretation because they relate directly to the ordinary
meaning of words in their ordinary context. For a relatively complete list of such
canons of construction see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at Appendix A.
71. See generally Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 20, at
131 n.39 (discussing policy maxims). For a relatively complete list of such canons of
construction see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at Appendix A.
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using legislative history to help determine the plain meaning of a
statutory provision. Absent an ambiguous statute under the Literal Rule,
or an ambiguous statute or an absurd plain meaning under the Golden or
Plain Meaning Rules, all three rules preclude resort to bits of legislative
history, such as committee reports, hearings, or debates, to ascertain the
meaning of a statutory provision.'
So understood, the Plain Meaning Rule, coupled with a broad approach
to statutes in pani materia, as well as a broad approach to the use of
both verbal and policy canons of construction, is virtually identical to a
narrow natural law approach to interpretation. Both involve full consideration of statutory context, both permit analysis of legislative purpose to
determine legislative intent as long as the purposes are derived from
considering the statute itself, and both reject use of legislative history to
determine a statute's plain meaning.73 Perhaps the main difference is
that the narrow natural law approach would probably phrase the weight
given to a statute's plain meaning as a "plain meaning presumption" rather than a rigid "plain meaning rule."74

72. See Fagan, supra note 14, at 374-80 (discussing the Plain Meaning's and Golden
Rule's rejection of legislative history in determining the plain meaning of a statute).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27, 38 (discussing the narrow natural
law approach); supra text accompanying notes 59-69 (discussing the broad plain
meaning approach).
74. See generally DIcKERSON, supra note 69, at 233 ("At best, there should be no
plain meaning 'rule,' only a plain meaning 'presumption.' It may also be true that
much of the judicial talk about 'plain meaning' is only a device for assigning the
burden of persuasion as between parties contending over the meaning of a statute.").
Of course, an additional difference between the two approaches is that the narrow
natural law approach rejected use of legislative history even if the plain text of the
statute was ambiguous or absurd, while under the plain meaning rule legislative history may be considered. See generally supra text accompanying notes 38, 72. Chief
Justice John Marshall's statutory interpretation opinions are instructive in this regard.
Some of these opinions suggest the adoption of a rigid plain meaning rule. See, e.g.,
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122, 202-03 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) ("[Wlhere great inconvenience
will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided, unless
the meaning of the legislature be plain; in which case it must be obeyed."). However,
some of Marshall's other opinions suggest adoption only of a "plain meaning presumption" approach. See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76, 9596 (1820) (Marshall, C.J., delivering the opinion of the Court) ("The case must be a
strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning
of words ... in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest."); Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 64-68 (1812)
(arguing for "literal construction" of the statute, but a part of determining the
statute's "real meaning," is derived from additional considerations of legislative pur-

A classic example of a modem version of a formalist Golden Rule of
interpretation is Justice Scalia's textualist approach. Justice Scalia follows the Golden Rule by refusing to use purpose to determine the plain
meaning of text.7" Justice Scalia is narrow on the use of legislative history, suggesting a willingness to follow even the English practice of almost never looking to legislative history.'6 However, on the use of statutes in pari materia Justice Scalia adopts a broader formalist approach,
permitting their use to determine a statute's plain meaning." Justice
Scalia also appears to adopt a broader formalist view on the canons of
statutory construction, evidencing a willingness to use both verbal and
policy-based canons of construction,' though he is skeptical of some.79
C. The HolmesianApproach
As discussed in previous articles, as a positivist approach, the
Holmesian approach to judicial decision-making shares with the formalist
approach a strong belief that the judge must follow the specific commands of the sovereign where such specific commands exist.' The
Holmesian view thus counsels judicial deference to the dominant forces
in society. 8 Under this view, the elected representatives of our democratic society-legislatures, not courts-properly balance public policy
concerns.' Courts should thus adopt an approach towards statutory

pose and interpreting words in other parts of the statute). In practice, of course,
such a theoretical disagreement may not be very important, because if the "inconvenience" is "great" or "strong" enough, most judges will be tempted to conclude that
the statute is not "plain" enough for that meaning to be enforced under either a
plain meaning rule or a plain meaning presumption approach.
75. Under a Golden Rule approach, arguments based upon statutory purpose are
appropriate only when the statute is ambiguous or when the statute's plain meaning
is absurd. See Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1627 (stating that Justice Scalia will examine
legislative purpose only if the statute's plain meaning is absurd).
76. See id. at 1598, 1615-16; see also supra notes 13-17. But see Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing sympathy for the American Golden Rule approach which permits use of legislative history
where "a statute which, if interpreted literally, produces an absurd . . . result.").
77. See Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1615.
78. See id. at 1616.
79. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40
CASE W. RES. L REv. 581, 581-86 (1989-90) (questioning the value of the policy maxim that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed).
80. See generally Kelso, supra note 19, at 541-43.
81. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Bel
Knap/Harvard University Press 1963) (1881) ("The first requirement of a sound body
of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the
community, whether right or wrong."); see also Kelso, supra note 19, at 5,12-43.
82. See G. Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes' Jurisprudence, 10 HOFSTRA L
REv. 633, 655 (1982) ("Holmes' [sic] job at the Supreme Court consisted of, in many

[Vol. 25: 37, 1997]

JudicialDecision-making
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

interpretation which counsels that a judge should follow the in-fact intent of the legislature which enacted the statute.
However, because the "life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience,"' the Holmesian approach rejects the formalist preference
for mechanically applied rules.' Because of this rejection, under a
Holmesian approach, a judge can properly look not only to the clear text
of the statute, but also to clear inferences of statutory purpose,' both
as revealed in the statute itself and in the statute's legislative history.'
The classic Holmesian style thus rejects a plain meaning rule limitation
on resort to legislative history in favor of an originalist approach to statutory interpretation. 7 A Holmesian judge finds it appropriate to resort
to legislative history in every case, but only to effectuate the in fact intent of the legislature. A Holmesian judge does not attempt to justify any
particular sound social policy interpretation of a statute through resort to
isolated bits of legislative history." As with constitutional law, the
heydey of the Holmesian approach to statutory interpretation spanned
the period of 1937-1954.'
instances, reviewing the constitutionality of actions of a legislature ....
Deference
to legislative policymaking was consistent with the views Holmes had developed on
the Massachusetts [Supreme] Court."); see also Kelso, supra note 19, at 542-43.
83. HOLMES, supra note 81, at 5.
84. See id. ("The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many
centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.").
85. See, e.g., United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) (Holmes, J., delivering the opinion of the court) ("[T]he general purpose is a more important aid to
the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.") (citing
Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174, 181 (1888).
86. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLuM.
L REV. 527, 538-44 (1947) (discussing the statutory interpretation theory of Holmes
and resort to legislative history).
87. See Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)
(Holmes, J., delivering the opinion of the court) (noting that the plain meaning rule
is "rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."); Zeppos, supra note 8, at 1084 (distinguishing "textualism" from "originalism" by noting that while textualists, like Justice
Scalia, "discourage inquiry into nontextual sources such as legislative history", legislative history is, in fact, "one of the main sources of originalist methodology."); see
also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (summarizing the originalist methodology).
88. See Frankfurter, supra note 86, at 543-44 ("Spurious use of legislative history
must not swallow the legislation so as to give point to the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute."); see also Kelso, supra note 19,
at 544-45 & nn.37-40 (discussing the Holmesian approach to statutory interpretation).
89. See generally Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 20, at

As with the natural law and formalist approaches, there is a narrow
and broad version of the Holmesian approach to statutory interpretation.
Under the narrow view, the judge adopts a strict originalist vision, and
follows precisely the specific intent of the legislature which enacted the
statute, without any reference to broader legislative purpose' or later
events.9 Under a broader H1olmesian view, if the legislature had a broad
purpose in mind, the court should give effect to that purpose.9 Under
the broader view, subsequent enactments, like administrative interpretations of statutes, can also play a role in determining what the statute
means.' Modem Holmesians tend to share this broader vision of a
judge's role in statutory interpretation cases.'

195-200. For a discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's use of this model of statutory
interpretation, grounded in Holmes's skepticism of moral values and the resulting
deference to the moral choices made by the legislature, see Thomas W. Merrill, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS
LJ. 621, 64246 (1994).
90. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135
U. PA. L REv. 1479 (1987) (discussing a model of statutory interpretation focusing on
the use of legislative history to determine the specific intent of the legislature on the
specific question before the court).
91. See Zeppos, supra note 8, at 1079 ("[E]vents subsequent to the enactment of
the statute [are] not relevant."); see also United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.) ("The Court attempts to minimize
the amendment's harshness by characterizing it as 'a curative measure,' quoting some
post-legislation legislative history (another oxymoron) ....").
92. See Frankfurter, supra note 86, at 539. Frankfurter states:
[T]he purpose which a court must effectuate is not that which Congress
should have enacted, or would have. It is that which it did enact, however
inaptly, because it may fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, even if
a specific manifestation was not thought of, as is often the very reason for
casting a statute in very general terms.
Id.; see also Eskridge, supra note 90, at 1482-84, 1502-03 (discussing the use of legislative history to help determine the legislature's general intent in passing a statute).
93. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., nc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984) (reasoning that an agency's interpretation of a legislative act
should be given "deference" because "[an] agency, to engage in informed rulemaking,
must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis."). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L REv. 2071 (1990) (discussing the reach of the Supreme Court's decision in
Chevron and limitations on the principles set forth in the case); Russell L Weaver &
Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations: A PostChevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U. L 411 (1992) (current volumes of this law review are cited as U. MEM. L REV.).
94. See generally Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (early
example of deference to later agency construction); Eskridge, supra note 90, at 150203 (stating that the general intent model prevailed after 1939). For example, Chief
Justice Rehnquist is an ardent supporter of the Chevron rule. See Merrill, supra note
89, at 644-45.
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D. The InstrumentalistApproach
The instrumentalist approach to statutory interpretation requires a
clear focus on how the correct purposes or policies of the statute would
be either advanced or retarded in the context of a particular case.95 For
an instrumentalist judge, the act of interpreting a constitution, statute, or
prior common law decision will often call for consideration of sound
social policy to resolve leeway in the law. Furthermore, there may be
cases in which the law does not command a particular result because the
law does not cover the exact situation or because each of two conflicting
rules arguably applies. In either case, a judge must make law to help
achieve a sound social policy result.'
The narrow instrumentalist approach is reflected in the Legal Process
school of Hart and Sacks.9 7 Under this approach, judicial creativity is
limited to interpreting a statute in such a way as to "fit the statute into
the legal system as a whole. " 's In pursuing this task, the court is supposed to depart from a pure originalist model by presuming that "'the
legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably,'"' even if the court knows that the statute was the
product of "'short-run currents of political expedience.'""° Gaps left in
statutes are filled in by the courts to "rationalize the law," making it "fair,
coherent, and purposive," while based on the legislature's actual general
purposes in enacting the law.'
A classic example of such an approach in practice is Justice Brennan's
opinion in the famous statutory interpretation case of United

95. See generally, Kelso, supra note 19, at 534. For a classic account of instrumentalist methodology, see KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 217 (1962) ("On the side both of case-law and of statutes, where the reason
stops there stops the rule; and in working with statutes it is the normal business of
the court not only to read the statute but also to implement that statute in accordance with purpose and reason.").
96. See generally Kelso, supra note 19, at 534-38. See also Robert S. Summers,
PragmaticInstrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66
CoRNELL L REV. 861, 864 (1981) ("[Instrumentalism] necessarily addresses official legal
personnel, their roles as 'social engineers,' and the technical skill they must deploy in
those roles.").
97. See Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1600.
98. See id. at 1601 (citing HAR & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1411, 1414).
99. See id. (quoting HAwr & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1415).
100. See id. (quoting HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1414).
101. See id. at 1602.

Steelworkers of America v. Weber. 2 In Weber, the Court held that Title
VII does not prohibit voluntary affirmative action by private employers. 3 The Court rejected the argument that the clear text of the statute
prohibited affirmative action, reasoning instead that such a reading
would violate the broad purpose of the Act to aid minorities."° Justice
Brennan used bits of legislative history to support this interpretation of
Title VII. ° The Holmesian originalist critique of this interpretation,
which appeared in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the case, was that Justice Brennan's opinion in Weber disregarded clear text, and followed a
selective reading of legislative history to produce a result compatible not
with congressional intent, but with Justice Brennan's view of sound social policy."°
An even broader instrumentalist approach to statutory interpretation
uses the Legal Process justification for judicial creativity as a steppingstone for even more creative judicial interpretation and law-making. As
noted by Professor John Kernochan, "[slome statutes, by virtue of their
10 7
generality, or otherwise, clearly contemplate judicial creativity."
Kernochan continues, "Resort to purpose will resolve many [problems,
but] there is often leeway in defining purposes .... Where such leeway
remains, legislative choices must be made by the courts .... The considerations beyond [legislative] intent to be weighed in [interpretation] we
may label 'policy' or 'public policy.' T
""°
An example of a court :following such an approach to statutory interpretation is West Winds, Inc. v. MV. Resolute." In West Winds, the
court stated,
[A] court interpreting a statute should: 'ask itself not only what the legislation
means abstractly, or even on the basis of legislative history, but also what it ought
to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day society. This approach
is required by the insuperable difficulties of readjusting old legislation by the legislative process and by the fact that it is obviously impossible to secure an omniscient legislature.""

102. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
103. See id. at 209.
104. See id. at 201.
105. See id. at 202-04.
106. See id. at 220-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Maltz, supra note 33, at
773-76 (discussing Weber); Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1619 (discussing Weber).
107. John M. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3
DALHOUSIE LJ. 333, 356 (1976).
108. Id. at 356-57.
109. 720 F.2d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1983).
110. Id. (quoting Arthur W. Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting
Statutes, 3 VAND. L REv. 456, 469 (1950)). For an in-depth discussion and defense of
this very activist model of judicial interpretation see GUIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGES OF STATUTES (1982). Even the West Winds court acknowledged,
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HI.

THE MODERN SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Four main issues separate the various approaches to statutory interpretation discussed above. First is the question of what level of judicial
creativity is appropriate in statutory interpretation cases. Second is the
question of the appropriate use of legislative histor to aid in statutory
construction. Third is the question of the use of legislative purpose in
statutory construction. Fourth is the question of the appropriate use of
subsequent enactments or agency interpretations to guide interpretation
of a statute. Focusing on how the modem Supreme Court is resolving
these four questions can frame which approach to statutory interpretation the current Court has adopted.
With regard to judicial creativity, it is clear that the modem Supreme
Court has rejected the judicial creativity approach of instrumentalism.
Such judicial creativity or policy-making typically appears today only in
the occasional opinion from Justice Stevens in dissent."'
Regarding legislative history, it is clear that the modem Supreme Court
has rejected the limitations on legislative history associated with formalism or the traditional natural law approach. Legislative history is routinely used today to help guide statutory interpretation, thus rejecting the
traditional natural law approach."' Legislative history is also used without a prior finding that the statute's plain meaning is ambiguous or absurd, thus rejecting the formalist Golden Rule or Plain Meaning Rule lim-

however, that[d]espite the general validity of this approach to statutory interpretation, the
judiciary is not the proper branch of government to update complex statutes
when legislative decisionmaking is necessary. For example, in the case of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act's creation of a new intermediate level of debt priorities covering contributions, Congress was the only branch of government
capable of making the necessary change.
West Winds, 720 F.2d at 1102.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 936 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the difference between contemporary statutory interpretation and an earlier view when "Congress looked to the courts to play an important role in the lawmaking process by relying on common-law tradition and common sense to fill gaps in
the law.").
112. See, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264
(1996); Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513
U.S. 414 (1995); Stephanie Wald, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation: Cases in the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court Term; Scalia Rails But Legislative
History Remains on Track, 23 Sw. U. L REV. 47 (1993).

itations on statutory interpretation."3 Only Justices Scalia and Thomas
argue with relative consistency for a formalist limitation on the use of
legislative history."4
With regard to purpose, the Court has warmly embraced purposive
analysis in its recent cases." 5 This embrace rejects the narrow version
of a Holmesian originalist approach which does not countenance such a
broad use of purpose." 6
Finally, the Court today routinely defers to agency construction of
administrative statutes to aid in interpreting a statute's meaning." 7 This
use of post-enactment agency construction underscores the court's rejection of a narrow Holmesian model." '8
The only approaches to statutory interpretation thus not rejected by
consideration of these four questions regarding statutory construction
are a broad Holmesian approach and a modem natural law approach.
Under either of these two statutory interpretation models, text and ordinary meaning are primary, but resort can always be had to legislative
purpose and to legislative history to check on legislative purpose."9 Judicial creativity is limited to the creativity intended by the drafters of the
statute.'2 Further, under either approach a court will be willing to acknowledge that sometimes the drafters of a statute may intentionally
leave a statutory problem unresolved, intending for an agency or the
court to resolve the problem in light of later acquired information and
experience.' 2

113. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 676-77 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring, joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.) (chastising the majority for relying
on legislative history even with "plain statutory language in hand").
114. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 44445 (1995) (noting that the
Court's conclusion was consistent with the basic purposes of a writ of habeus corpus); Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan, 513 U.S. at 416 (1995) (beginning
statutory interpretation analysis by describing "the general purpose" of the Act);
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 (1995) (noting that "[w]hile the
meaning of the text is by no means clear, this is in our view the only reading that
comports with the statutory purpose . ..

").

116. See supra text accompanying note 90.
117. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). See generally Weaver & Schweitzer, supra note 93; Sunstein, supra
note 93.
118. See supra text accompanying note 91.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 21-26, 36-46 (discussing the natural law
model); supra text accompanying notes 83-89 (discussing the Holmesian model).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35 (discussing the natural law model);
supra text accompanying notes 81-84, 86 (discussing the Holmesian model).
121. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (noting, among other things,
under the natural law model, courts had a duty to resolve statutory problems); supra
text accompanying notes 92-94 (discussing that under the Holmesian model courts
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There is, potentially, one slight difference between a broad Holmesian
and a modem natural law approach. Related to the last observation
above, this difference is the extent to which a judge will be willing to
conclude that the legislature intended to leave a problem open for judicial or agency resolution in light of the legislature's purpose. Legislators
operating under a natural law tradition are slightly more likely to leave
problems open for later judicial or agency construction than legislators
operating under a Holmesian tradition. This is because the natural law
tradition relies more on reasoned elaboration of the law by later official
actors,l" while the Holmesian tradition is a positivist tradition relying
on positive enactments by democratically-elected legislative bodies."
Because judges have a tendency to presume that the legislature is operating out of the same interpretative tradition as the judge,"a a modem
natural law judge may be slightly more willing than a Holmesian judge to
conclude that the legislature intended to leave a statute open in this way.
In most cases, however, this difference will be slight and hard to detect in practice. Judges in both traditions will conclude in some cases
that the legislature intended to leave a statutory provision open for later
agency or judicial resolution. Furthermore, this difference is even less
pronounced than it may first appear. Natural law judges in the American
tradition, operating out of the Enlightenment vision of society based

may resort to general purpose and post-enactment agency interpretation to help guide
statutory interpretation).
122. See generally Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation,supra note 20, at
157-59; Kelso, supra note 34, at 1058-60, 1063-64. As this author has noted in a previous article:
[W]hen history indicates that the Framers and ratiflers embedded broad natural law concepts in the Constitution, like those dealing with the First Amendment, equal protection, and due process, they may have intended "to provide
no hard-and-fast answers . . . and to let the answers develop over time in a
common-law fashion. After all, the framers were common-law lawyers."
Id. at 1060 (quoting DANIEL FARBER ET AL., CONSTITrTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE
CONSTITUTION'S THURD CENTURY 77 (1993)).

123. See Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 20, at 195-200;
Kelso, supra note 34, at 1061-63. As this author has noted in a previous article:
Holmesian judges are less likely than natural law judges to conclude that the
Framers and ratifiers intended some concept in the Constitution to reflect an

Enlightenment natural law principle. Instead, Holmesian judges are more likely to conclude that the Framers and ratifiers had a specific meaning in mind,
which they intended to remain fixed.
Id. at 1062 (citations omitted).
124. See Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 20, at 148-49.

upon a social contract, see their role not to create such openings, or
leeway, in a statute, but rather to follow the in-fact intent of the legislature-the same view as judges in the Holmesian tradition.'25
This substantial similarity between a broad Holmesian approach and a
natural law approach to statutory interpretation has been noted as far
back as the heyday of Holmesian interpretation in the 1940s and early
1950s.'26 For example, commenting upon the famous Holmesian Judge
Learned Hand's approach to statutory interpretation,'27 Professor Robert Lancaster noted in 1956:
In his Courts on Trial, Judge Jerome Frank... commented on th~e] practice of
Hand's of appealing to the equity of a statute. Commenting on the case of
Usatorre v. The Victoria he said: 'It there appears that a great American judge
[who tells me that he has never studied Aristotle], has expressed views that are a
modernized paraphrase of that ancient Greek's thesis.' The learned
judge goes on
to point out in copious footnotes to the Usatorre case the similarity between
Hand's technique and that of Aristotle and even Plowden.'"

Professor Lancaster summarized Judge Learned Hand's approach as
follows:
1. If the words of the statute are so clear and plain as to admit of no doubts as to
how they should be applied; if they clearly express the purpose and intent of the
lawmakers, the task of the judge is a relatively easy one; he applies the law as it
is written to the solution of the judicial problem before him and lets the chips fall
where they may.
2. If the wdrds of the statute are so general as to give little guidance, the judge
who is principally concerned with effectuating the intent and realizing the implicit

125. See generally id. at 159-65 (contrasting the American natural law tradition with
a "Platonic Guardian" natural law model where judges impose natural law principles
on society); Kelso, supra note 34, at 1067-73 (discussing how the Enlightemnent concept of government as a social contract limits judicial discretion to following those
principles placed into the Constitution, or in statutory interpretation into the statute,
by the framers and ratifiers of those documents); supra text accompanying notes 3235, 80-88 (stating that natural law and Holmesian approaches are following the in-fact
intent of the legislature).
126. See supra text accompanying note 89 (discussing the 1940s and early 1950s as
heydey of Holmesian interpretation). This period followed a formalist period of interpretation which existed from the Civil War until the 1920s and 1930s. See Kelso,
supra note 19, at 533, 552-63. In addition, the Holmesian heyday pre-dated the instrumentalist Legal Process approach of the late 1950s. See supra text accompanying
notes 3-7, 97-101 (discussing the Legal Process approach of the 1950s as a version of
instrumentalism).
127. For discussion of Judge Learned Hand as a follower of the Holmesian model
of judicial decision-making, see Merrill, supra note 89, at 629 n.24. See also Kelso,
Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 20, at 196 n.372; Keiso, supra
note 19, at 544 n.37, 545 n.40.
128. Robert S. Lancaster, Judge Learned Hand and The Limits of Judicial Discretion, 9 VAND. L REv. 427, 449 (1956) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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purpose of the legislators, must seek to discover that intent and that purpose from
the words themselves, the context in which they are used, both rhetorical and
cultural, and from a case study of the history of the particular piece of legislation
as it was hammered out in the final give-and-take that preceded its final acceptance and final phrasing. Once this intent and this purpose is so discovered the
judge must decide the case before him in such a way as to give meaning to the
intent of the legislature and fulfillment to its purposes.
3. However, if the lawmakers patently had no intent in respect to the issues before the judge, if they obviously failed to envisage circumstances arising as they
did arise, then the judge has his difficult hours. Since he is charged with the responsibility of going no further than the legislators would have gone had they the
case before them, it is the judge's duty to fathom out the half-emerged purposes
behind the legislation and to savor the very spirit of the enactment The judicial
function here might be compared to what the expert mender does with a hole
burned in a fine coat which he reweaves - that is, he fits into the legislative
omission legal material of the same pattern and design in such a way as give [sic]
succor to those half-expressed, upthrusting purposes, that groping intent
4. When it is impossible to dig out any intent, when no underlying purpose may
be even dimly discerned, the judge should attempt to weigh and balance the competing interests and compromise them in the spirit of the times, never going so far
as to accept what, in his opinion, is not yet acceptable in the society of which he
is a part, but still moulding the law gently and by degrees in such a manner as to
help in giving expression to the jural aspirations of his age. And all of this must
be done with such good sense and proper restraint, with such understanding and
sympathy as neither to violate the established principles of social conduct nor
jeopardize the prestige and high dignity of the judicial office."

In the near future, most Supreme Court decisions can be predicted to
reflect this kind of approach to statutory interpretation. As Judge Hand
himself noted, this approach represents a middle course between the
extremes of either a formalist or instrumentalist approach to statutory
interpretation. "3

129. Id. at 450-51. For a more extensive discussion of Judge Hand's theory of statutory interpretation, with extended quotes from Judge Hand's opinions and law review
articles on point, see id. at 443-50.
130. See Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434, 441-42 n.16 (1949).
As I have said, there are two extreme schools ....
One school says that
the judge must follow the letter of the law absolutely. I call this the dictionary [formalist] school. No matter what the result is, he must read the words
in their usual meaning and stop where they stop. No judges have ever carried on literally in that spirit, and they would not be long tolerated if they
did ....
The other school would give them almost complete latitude. They
argue that a judge should not regard the law; that this has never really been
done in the past, and that to attempt ever to do it is an illusion. He must

Of course, within this broad center, certain variations may appear.
Occasionally Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, or Chief Justice
Rehnquist may join in an opinion reflecting a formalist Plain Meaning
Occasionally, Justice
Rule approach to statutory interpretation.'
or
Justice
Souter
may
express
some sympathy
Breyer, Justice Ginsburg,
for a narrow instrumentalist Legal Process approach.' However, as indicated earlier, the interpretation models of Justices Breyer and
O'Connor, as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg, are more properly described as falling within a
broad Holmesian, modem natural law approach to statutory interpretation. 33

conform his decision to what honest men would think right, and it is better
for him to look into his own heart to find out what that is [an instrumentalist approach].
Id. (quoting Judge Learned Hand).
In contrast, Judge Hand's approach has been dubbed 'the proliferation of purpose."
See Frankfurter, supra note 86, at 529. Under this approach it is appropriate to use
legislative history to help determine the in-fact intent of the legislature. See id. at
538-44. For an argument that Judge Learned Hand would not consult legislative history today given its misuse in recent times, see Note, Why Learned Hand Would
Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L REv. 1005 (1992).
131. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 676-77 (1997) (Justice O'Connor
joining in a Plain Meaning Rule concurrence with Justices Scalia and Thomas); Public
Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 463-64, 471-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.) (Justice Kennedy's
concurrence followed a plain meaning approach to reject the majority's analysis
which was explicitly grounded in the approach of Judge Learned Hand). As noted
earlier, because Chief Justice Marshall operated out of the traditional natural law ban
on the use of legislative history to aid statutory construction, a number of his opinions for the Supreme Court also suggest a Plain Meaning Rule, or at least a "plain
meaning presumption", approach. See supra notes 40, 61, 74 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 18, at 847 (citing, with approval, HART & SACKS,
supra note 2, though done in the context of a natural law concern with "coherence
and workability, and widely shared substantive values, such as helping to achieve
justice by interpreting the law in accordance with the 'reasonable expectations' of
those to whom it applies"). For discussion of the importance of a natural law tradition of coherence, workability, and reasoned elaboration of the law, see Kelso, Styles
of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 20, at 164-65.
133. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (noting that all six of these Justices reject Justice Scalia's textualist approach); supra notes 41-42, 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing opinions authored by Justices O'Connor and Breyer, and
joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, as following a modem natural law
approach to interpretation); supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (analyzing Chief
Justice Rehnquist as a follower of a broad Holmesian model of statutory interpretation). This basic agreement on how to approach questions of statutory interpretation
does not guarantee, of course, the Court will always reach consistent and predictable
conclusions in individual cases. This is particularly true for complex and technical
statutes, where the interplay of statutory language, legislative policy choices, and
background legislative purposes may be difficult for the Court to untangle. For exam-
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III. CONCLUSION

This Article has suggested that four main approaches to judicial
decision-making have existed in American legal history. These four approaches can be called natural law, formalism, Holmesian, and
instrumentalism. Ten years ago, the Court was decidedly split among
these four approaches, with one formalist (Justice Scalia); two
Holmesians (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White); four instrumentalists (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens); and two
emerging modem natural law voices (Justices O'Connor and Kennedy).' 4 The proper approach to statutory interpretation was thus in flux.
On the current Supreme Court, however, this fragmentation has been
resolved. Among the current Justices on the Supreme Court, there appear to be five Justices who, to varying extents, approach cases most
closely from a modem natural law approach: Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The Court also has: one clear
Holmesian (Chief Justice Rehnquist); two formalists (Justices Scalia and
Thomas); and one moderate instrumentalist (Justice Stevens)." As discussed earlier in this Article, for statutory interpretation purposes the
broad Holmesian and modem natural law approaches agree on a basic
model of statutory interpretation.'" Thus, six Justices on the current
Supreme Court share a basic agreement on how to approach questions of
statutory interpretation.
Given this fact, there should be relatively few disagreements in the
near future on the Supreme Court regarding the proper approach to statutory interpretation. After a decade of debate and sorting out various
statutory interpretation theories prompted by the fragmentation on the
Supreme Court of a decade ago, we may be headed again for a period of
relative quiet in statutory interpretation doctrine."7

pie, although the Court appears to have rejected the more formalist approach to
bankruptcy cases of the early 1990s, see generally Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist
Court, Strict Statutory Construction, and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 CLEV. ST. L REv.

435, 440-44 (1994), recent bankruptcy cases, although using a modem natural law approach which focuses on ordinary meaning, purpose, precedent, legislative history,
canons of construction, and practical reason, have not been a model of clarity. See,
e.g., United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2106
(1996).
134. See generally Kelso, supra note 19, at 581-602 & n.266.
135. See generally Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 20, at
227 & n.604.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 119-33.
137. Of course, unlike the quiet between the 1950s and 1980s, which was the prod-

uct of a relative consensus on the Legal Process approach to statutory interpretation,
the new consensus reflects a modern natural law/broad Holmesian model of interpretation. This is the approach that was predicted to emerge over a decade ago at the
beginning of the ferment concerning statutory interpretation. See KELSO & KELSO,
STUDYING LAW, supra note 20, at 314 ("[Tlhe temper of the Court seems to indicate a
return to a Holmesian approach. As noted, this is also the same 'as the Natural Law
approach, updated to permit the use of legislative history materials to discover legislative purpose."). For a brief sununary of this approach to interpretation, in outline
form, see id. at 272-74. For a similar, but more detailed, listing of sources of statutory construction see Zeppos, supra. note 8, at 1138-41.
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